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“Let’s imagine a count ry of literati.” 
(Alberto Fujimori) 
 
“You can not argue with a chain reaction.” 
 (Deming) 
 
Introduction 
Alberto Fujimori had all the conditions to catch the eye of international analysts.   He won the 
presidency of Peru in 1990 in a highly spectacular campaign, beating all rivals (and 
predictions).  Doing so, he became the paradigm of antipolitics, a political style that in the 
1990’s was able to win elections in several countries, including ones with very high per 
capita income.  In this sense he was a pioneer, aware of the power of his innovation: when it 
came to his ears that he was being imitated all around the world he claimed wryly that he held 
“the copyright” of antipolitics.2  In 1992 he closed the Congress, counting upon widespread 
support among the  rich, the middle classes, and the poor.3  Since, contrary to his campaign 
promises, he was implementing a very severe adjustment programme,4 it seemed quite 
evident that he was expressing the old links between liberal economic policies, the rejection 
of the old political class (a rejection sometimes tagged as ‘neopopulism’), and antidemocratic 
tendencies.5 
 
When Fujimori fell, all the democrats of the world sighed with relief, and the majority of 
them turned their eyes elsewhere.  In doing so, they missed the equally important, though less 
flashy, second part of the story: antipolitics easily survived the fall of Fujimori, and continues 
to this day.  If Fujimori showed that the preponderance of antipolitics and a critical 
undermining of the system of checks and balances could go hand- in-hand, his successors 
                                                 
1 This paper forms part of the research project ‘Democratic sustainability in the Andean countries’, funded by 
the Crisis States Research Centre at the London School of Economics & Political Science. I wish to thank Notre 
Dame University, which awarded me a travel grant to carry out research in Peru. 
2 Julio Cotler, ‘Crisis políticas, outsiders y democraduras.  El fujimorismo’, in Perelli et al. (eds), Partidos y 
clase política en América Latina en los 90, San José, Costa Rica: IIDH-Capel, 1995, pp.117-142. 
3 Martín Tanaka, ‘Los partidos políticos en el fujimorismo y los retos de su construcción’, in Marcelo Cavarozzi 
& Juan Aval Medina (eds), El asedio a la política.  Los partidos latinoamericanos en la era neoliberal, Rosario, 
Argentina: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Homo Sapiens Editores, 2002, pp.317-348. 
4 Susan Stokes, ‘Democratic accountability and policy change: economic policy in Fujimori’s Peru’, 
Comparative Politics 29:2 (1997), pp.209-226. 
5 See Roberts, Kenneth, ‘Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism in Latin America: the Peruvian 
case’, World Politics 48 (1995), pp.82-116; and Bruce Kay, ‘Fujipopulism and the liberal state in Peru, 1990-
1995’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs  38:4 (1996), pp.55-98. 
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have demonstrated that it can also coexist with fully competitive elections.  Furthermore, 
many of the themes, perceptions, and feelings that fed the Fujimori saga are still dominant in 
Peru’s polity.  According to a survey on political parties made by Lima University in 2003, 
only 16.3 percent of those interviewed admitted trusting the political parties, and 80.9 percent 
said they did not; political parties appeared as the least trusted institution, just behind judicial 
power.   Only 21.6 percent of the sample trusted the Congress, against 76.1 percent that 
mistrusted it.6  The result is that, from 2000 (the year Fujimori fell) on, we find an increasing 
party fragmentation (see Table 1), and extremely high levels of rejection of all things 
political. 7  The political system that was destroyed by Fujimori was not replaced by another 
one – nature perhaps does not tolerate a vacuum, but society apparently does.  
 
Table 1 - Electoral fragmentation (in seats) – Effective number of parties in Peru8 
 
1978 Constitutional Assembly - 4.44 
1980 
Lower House: 2.47 
Senate: 3.42 
1985 
Lower House: 4.07 
Senate: 5.33 
1990 
Lower House: 7.25 
Senate: 7.6 
1992 
Congreso Constituyente Democrático 
(Fujimori’s Constitutional Assembly): 5.27 
1995 Unicameral congress: 2.91 
2000 Unicameral congress: 3.81 
2001** 6.64** 
Source: Calculations based on Peru electoral en cifras, save 2001, where the source is the web page of the 
ONPE (Organización Electoral Peruana).  
** In votes  
 
This in fact involves three questions.  First, was the Peruvian political system actually 
destroyed by Fujimori?  The answer is a definite yes.  After the military gave back power to 
the civilians (1978-79), the political landscape was dominated by three main tendencies 
(Marxist left, the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), and the centre-right) 
that collected more than 90% of the vote in each election.  Now, they can muster no more 
than 40% of the votes between them, and only the APRA really survives as a stable party.9  
The politico-ecological balance that made possible the Peruvian democratic transition has 
long since disappeared.   
 
                                                 
6 Martin Tanaka, ‘Los partidos políticos en el Perú y la reforma política’, mimeo, 2004. 
7 Which is not foreign to the good position of Fujimori in the opinion polls, despite his enormous corruption 
scandals. 
8 Unless stated otherwise, I present my calculations based on the extraordinary Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla, Peru 
político en cifras 1821-2001, Fiedrich Ebert Stiftung, Lima, 2001. 
9 Acción Popular (AP), another party of centre-right tendency, also subsists, but as a minor player. 
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Second, is the process of destruction of these groups so astonishing? Are we speaking about 
the demise of parties proper and of a real party system, 10 or about loose clientelistic structures 
with no real roots in society, that should have disappeared anyway?  The answer is a qualified 
yes (yes, it is astonishing; yes, they were bona fide parties).  The qualifications are obvious.  
Indeed,  the democratic traditions of Peru are slim.  From 1931 to 1980 there were only two 
peaceful, electorally regulated transfers of power.  So the main procedure for the rotation of 
elites in the government was not elections.  Even then, universal suffrage was severely 
restricted.  Illiterates – the majority of the indigenous peoples – could not vote, and the 1932 
Constitution incorporated a clause that prohibited the electoral participation of any party 
“affiliated to international organizations”, which in practice was directed against the biggest 
mass organisation (the APRA, that pretended to be a Latin American party), and possibly 
against the communists.  When, in the midst of the democratic transition (DT), Peruvians 
were summoned to elect a Constitutional Assembly, their biggest political figure and the 
historical leader of the APRA, with more than 50 years of continental leadership, Víctor Raúl 
Haya de la Torre, cast for the first time in his life a vote; a commentator remarked with 
amazement that in a very real (democratic) sense, at his 83 years he was “a political virgin”.11  
But if this Matusalem ignored the meaning of competitive elections, at least he knew very 
well what was a sustained and highly orgainsed and articulated effort to address the masses.  
His rivals could not say the same.12   Lack of established traditions is an obvious source of 
weakness; building them may take long, and is a process always subject to reversals.  
Additionally, if in the 1990’s the Peruvian parties were wiped away – and without very high 
levels of repression – this means that they were not prepared to survive in the new conditions.  
But this Darwinian argument – related to Schumpeter’s proverbial “creative destruction” – 
fails to specify what the new conditions were, and what type of ‘adaptation failures’ they 
triggered.  One of the rutinary claims about Latin American, and in general Third World, 
parties is that they are not grounded on social cleavages and, in general, constitute a messy 
web of shortsighted interests and appetites: an unruly bunch of tribes, to use Duverger’s 
imagery.  Certainly, several Peruvian analysts of the 1980’s would apply precisely that 
description to their parties.  However, as Tanaka has shown powerfully, the Peruvian 
situation was quite different: the DT parties expressed quite well key social and ideological 
cleavages and were highly orgainsed;13 there was a strong Marxist left, with a significant 
mass constituency; the APRA has been throughout its history an extremely strong and solid 
apparatus, making a conscious effort to insert the life of its members into the frame of its 
organisational routines; and, very much according to Duverger’s predictions, the centre-right 
parties found that the only way to compete in the public realm was to imitate and adopt the 
(succesful) practices of organisation building and mass mobilisation of the APRA and the 
left.14  Moreover, until the very end the political preferences processed by the political system 
expressed social cleavages quite neatly.  In Table 2 it is shown that the Peruvians felt the 
Marxist left and the APRA tended to side with the poor (much more the first than the second) 
– they were ‘their’ parties, in the sense described by Lipset and Rokkan in the context of 
                                                 
10 Giovanni Sartori, Partidos y sistemas de partidos, Alianza, Madrid, 2002. See Mainwaring’s discussion of 
Sartori and his adaptation to Latin America (Scott Mainwaring, Rethinking party systems in the third wave of 
democratization. The case of Brazil, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1999). 
11 Luis Jochamowitz, Ciudadano Fujimori.  La construcción de un político, Lima: PEISA, 1993, p.212. 
12 In this sense, the only Peruvian party that can reasonably be tagged as “traditional” is the APRA. 
13 Martín Tanaka, Los espejismos de la democracia.  El colapso del sistema de partidos en el Peru , IEP, Lima, 
1998. 
14 Maurice Duverger, Les partis politiques, Paris: Armand Colin, 1976. 
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developed countries.15  More than 50 percent of those interviewed thought that the Marxist 
parties represented the lower classes, while less than 10 percent thought that the centre-right 
ones did.16   According to Durand, the upper class of the capital, Lima, voted for the right 
wing PPC in 1985. Afterwards, possibly instigated by the significance of the Marxist threat, it 
turned to the APRA candidate, Alan García; but in the meantime the lower classes were 
dividing their vote between García (53.5% of their vote) and the left (31.3%).17 All in all, the 
parties were well orgainsed, the ideological differences between them were relatively clear, 
and voting patterns made sense, with both ideological and social divides more or less 
matched.  So here we have a quandary.  Why should the citizenship flock away from the 
organisations that were expressing tolerably well one of the the basic cleavages of their 
society?  Why did they diverge so brusquely from the path predicted by Lipset and Rokkan: a 
freezing of the political system over those cleavages?18  A listing of the alleged sins of the 
Peruvian parties does not answer this question, nor does it explain the radicality and 
suddenness of the collapse of the party system, and the persistence of its crisis.  The big bang 
of the Peruvian political system should be interpreted as a representation of a crisis, not as a 
crisis of representation.   
 
Table 2 – Outcomes of democracy: political parties and class representation 
Answers to the following question:  do you believe that this party represents the upper class, the 
middle class, or the lower class? 
 Libertad 
% 
PPC 
% 
AP 
% 
APRA 
% 
Cambio 90 
% 
IS 
% 
IU 
% 
Upper 
class 
64.7 62.3 44.7 28.8 17.7 8 10.8 
Middle 
class 
12.7 16.7 30.3 29 43.2 21.2 25.2 
Low class 2.7 1.7 4.5 12.2 13.5 24.8 32.3 
All of 
them 
2 1.8 2.5 5 6.3 1.7 2.2 
None  4.3 4.7 5.8 13.3 5.2 13 12.7 
NA 13.6 12.8 11.7 11.7 14.1 31.3 16.8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: IMASEN, quoted in Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla, Los enigmas del poder: Fujimori 1990-1996, 
Fundación Fiedrich Ebert, Lima, Peru, 1997, p. 83 
 
Third, is it true that there has not been a full- fledged recovery?  Once again, the answer is a 
qualified yes.  When full democratic competition was reinstated, the parties made a 
                                                 
15 S. Lipset & S. Rokkan, ‘Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments: anintroduction’, in S. 
Lipset & S. Rokkan (eds), Party systems and voter alignments: cross national perspectives, New York: Free 
Press, 1967. 
16 See also Fernando Rospigliosi, ‘Las elecciones peruanas de 1990’, in Rodolfo Cerdas, Juan Rial and Daniel 
Zovato (eds), Una tarea inconclusa , San José, Costa Rica: IIDH-Capel-Fiedrich Nauman Stiftung, 1992. 
17 Durand, Francisco, ‘El fenómeno Fujimori y la crisis de los partidos’, Revista Mexicana de Sociología 58:1 
(1996), p.111. 
18 Please note that Rokkan’s expectations cannot be dismissed as purely European.  In Latin America, with the 
instability of its democratic institutions, the argument goes, we should expect other results.  In fact, for almost 
all the cases analysed by Rokkan, democratic collapse and reversal in the process of universalisation of rights 
and entitlements were frequent. 
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comeback.19 The APRA finally survived, and is still the main political force in Peru.  The 
centre-right parties also resurrected, and they still play a certain role.  After hitting bottom in 
1995 (when all of them practically disappeared), some of the DT parties are back in the game. 
The post-Fujimori institutions have been manipulated, and will continue to be so, to 
strengthen the parties,20 and this might have a certain positive effect.  But this has been a 
feeble recovery, full of uncertainities.  Table 1 already showed us that party fragmentation 
increased.  The only old actor that really revived was the APRA – honouring its enthusiastic 
motto “el APRA nunca muere” (the APRA never dies) –  but even then its recovery has been 
partial and may be insufficient to defeat non-party candidates.   In 2001, the presidency was 
won by Alejandro Toledo, who ran in the name of Perú Posible (previously País Posible), 
precisely the type of vacuous tag that one would associate with antipolitics.  Another main 
runner was Lourdes Florez, who spoke in the name of a broad front created by her centre-
right party, which flirted openly with anti-politics.  As seen above, the defining 
characteristics of the present situation are the very high levels of electoral fragmentation, the 
enormous discredit of politicians and parties, and the proliferation of small and short- lived 
political undertakings that, in the general ecology of politics, are a new species that compete 
succesfully with the more stable, but clumsy, parties proper.  Political actors have become 
mainly simple acronyms,21 with no structure whatsoever (not even the tribal structure that 
Duverger had imagined), the epitome of this being the present president’s ‘party’, Perú 
Possible.  Symptomatically, Fujimori – whose popularity still ranges high – has widespread 
simpathies, but no coherent force to support him; he has been “the victim of his own 
demolition job”, according to Tanaka’s witty comment.22  The meaning of this for practical 
politicians is simple and brutal: established parties have, and will have, a very hard time 
trying to win the main electoral prize, the presidency.  Since Peruvians elect – as all Latin 
Americans – their president through a run off system, a party such as the APRA with between 
20 and 30 percent of the vote does not have the least chance to win if the bulk of independent 
voters support – as is likely – a coalition against it, giving the politicians incentives to 
denounce, or at least to distance themselves from, opaque party games.  
 
A destruction process, thus, took place, and despite a fragile recovery of parties there are 
some basic continuities between the Fujimori period and today’s political system.  This has 
hindered political stabilisation and consolidation.  In the apt words of Dargent Bocanegra, 
“Peru’s [democratic] transition is interminable”. 23  This paper is devoted to the discussion of 
why the destruction took place, and why many of the traits of the demolition phase remained.  
It must be remembered that these are not trivial questions: several countries in Latin 
American and elsewhere have suffered very strong political and governance crises but have 
avoided the big bang of their political system.  Indeed, increasingly there are signs of a 
general weakening of parties in many parts of the world,24 but such weakening has different 
degrees and manifestations.  Why did it take such a virulent form in Peru? Why have there 
                                                 
19 Charles Kenney, ‘The death and rebirth of a party system. Peru 1978-2001’, Comparative Political Studies, 
36:10 (2003), pp.1210-1239. 
20 Tanaka (2004). 
21 Carlos Vargas León, ‘El nuevo mapa político peruano: Partidos políticos, movimientos nacionales, e 
independientes’, Documento de Trabajo 103, Lima: IEP, 1999. 
22 Martín Tanaka, ‘Los partidos políticos en el Peru, 1992-1999.  Estabilidad, sobrevivencia y política 
mediática’, JCAS-IEP Documento de Trabajo  108 (1999). 
23 Eduardo Dargent Bocanegra, ‘La transición interminable. Qué pasa con los partidos políticos en el Peru’, in 
Comisión Andina de Juristas, Peru 2000: un triunfo de la democracia, Lima: CAJ, 2000, pp.235-278. 
24 There is a growing literature about this topic. See, for example, Mark Blyth & Richard Katz, ‘From catch all 
politics to cartelisation: the political economy of the cartel party’, West European Politics, 28:1 (2005), pp.33-
60. 
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been no signs of a clear improvement after Fujimori’s regime fell?  What does this tell us 
about other weakening processes elsewhere?  To offer an answer, I will draw on two ideas.  
First, Rokkan’s and Lipset’s: stable political systems politicise a set of key political 
cleavages.  They can do it obliquely, the cleavage can become fuzzy or tame with time, but 
parties keep on building on it.  In that sense, parties and their key motives are always “older 
than their electorate”. 25  Second, Duverger’s notion of electoral competition.  For Duverger, 
politics (or more exactly, universal suffrage politics) can be read as a technology to address 
mass constituencies in the right way.  Duverger thought that, since manual workers were the 
densest populated niche in society, and the one that used more consistently its free time in 
politics, in a country where the rotation of political elites in power was regulated by universal 
suffrage, the working class parties had an ingrained technological advantage.  They were able 
to encadrer (insert organisationally, and also defining their intellectual and cultural horizons) 
their members in a huge organisational network.  This obliged all political forces to imitate 
those parties to try to survive: a “contagion to the left” (fascism is the best example of this).  
The contagion to the left could end up weakening democracy, giving a premium to forces that 
used its institutional universe (of which universal suffrage is a part) to undermine it.26  
 
Putting both ideas together: the existence of a stable party system depends on three crucial 
capacities. The capacity to maintain a technological superiority over competitors and new 
potential entrants, the capacity to express over long periods preferences and expectations of 
relevant social niches, and the capacity to link both the best ‘political technologies’ available 
and the preferences of social groups to a concrete experience of government. I will try to 
show how, in these three senses, the Peruvian DT parties were critically undermined, and 
then discuss why the recovery has been so feeble. 
 
In the first part of the paper, I claim that in some senses the Peruvian parties were very 
strong, and that this proved even more fatal for their survival chances than their (very real) 
weaknesses.  The second part focuses on the consequences of Fujimori’s demolition effort.  
The third one offers an interpretation of the trajectory of Peru’s party system, and of its 
difficulties to recover after Fujimori’s shock.  I discuss, in a speculative fashion, the ways in 
which the Peruvian case can give us an understanding of party breakdown (or critical 
weakening) today.  I suggest there that it is a result of an ‘Escherian’ type of politics: one 
based on the politicisation of the fracture between politics and society. 
 
Organisational strength and the incumbent curse. 
Strengths and weaknesses of the DT party system. 
In what sense can we say that parties are strong or weak? Mainwaring suggests that there are 
four basic dimensions of party strength: the stability of interparty competition measured 
through electoral volatility; the roots that parties have in society (measured, for example, 
through the degree of party identification, or the support to the given party in all electoral 
events); legitimacy; and the solidity of party organisations.27  These four dimensions can be 
operationalised through two parameters: electoral volatility, measuring rootedness and 
stability; and organisational solidity.  According to Table 3, the combination of moderate 
volatility and strong organisations is the normal case, both in the statistical and normative 
sense, while high electoral volatiliy and weak party structures is the situation tipical of ‘semi-
                                                 
25 Lipset & Rokkan (1967). 
26 Duverger (1976). 
27 Scott Mainwaring, ‘Prologo’, in Francisco Gutierrez (ed.), Degradacion o cambio, Bogotá: Norma, 2001, 
p.17. 
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democracies’ (such as Fujimori’s Peru) or of very incipient DT’s.  Two rare combinations 
remain: low volatility and weak organisations (for example, Colombia in the last three 
decades), and high volatility with strong organisations, a box that Mainwaring left empty.  By 
what follows, it can be seen that Peru in the 1980’s fits very well into that box. 
 
Table 3  - Peru in the 1980’s.  The missing link? 
 
 Solid party organisations, moderate individualism.  
Weak party organisations, 
very strong individualism. 
Moderate electoral volatility 
Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras, 
Uruguay, virtually all the 
democracies of West Europe, 
United States, Japan 
Colombia 
High electoral volatility Peru in the 1980’s 
Ecuador, Peru (after Fujimori), 
Russia, Venezuela from 1993 
Source: Mainwaring (2001). 
 
 
Table 4 – ‘Standard’ volatility in Peru’s national elections (in votes) 
 
Period President Upper house Lower house Unicameral congress 
1980-1985 66.33% 67.66% 68.05% --- 
1985-1990 67.65%* 65.66% 70.62% --- 
1990-1995** 66.39% --- --- --- 
1995-2000*** 71.16% --- --- --- 
2000-2001 65.27%* --- --- 50.17% 
* Calculations based on the the first round 
** Peru had a bicameral congress until 1990; from 1995 it is unicameral.  Thus, the 1990-1995 parliamentary 
volatility can not be evaluated. 
*** Such a high volatility in presidential elections in the 1990’s may appear strange, given the stability of the 
vote for Fujimori.  It must be remembered that the Table counts volatility regarding parties (or acronyms), not 
regarding individuals.  Fujimori was sincerely antiparty, and in each election ran with a different acronym. 
 
 
That the combination was actually there is not hard to see.  I show in Table 4 that the levels 
of volatility were from the very beginning quite high, both for congressional and presidential 
elections.  Additionally, Peru suffered the incumbent’s curse: the governing president’s party 
did not win the elections once.  This continues today, as Toledo’s government is quite 
discredited, with rates of approval in the last two years that range between a minimum of 6 
percent and a maximum of 15 percent, and Perú Posible has not the least chance of winning 
the presidency, if it even decides to inscribe its own candidate.  The incumbent’s curse – a 
phenomenon that is found in an even stronger version in Ecuador – suggests a deep failure of 
governability: parties are not able to satisfy the expectations of their voters, or they even 
cheat them openly. 28 
                                                 
28 As in the case of Fujimori, that Stokes analyses in detail (Stokes, 1997).  Of course, cheating and disaffection 
are not necessarily associated: Fujimori enjoyed widespread support despite his doing precisely the contrary of 
what he had promised to do (and doing other things he had not hinted he had in mind, like closing the 
Congress), while presidents Belaúnde (1980-85), García (1985-90), and Toledo (2001- ), have kept their 
promises more or less faithfully and ended their periods completely compromised.  The issue merits a more 
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At the same time, during Peru’s DT, political organisation and mobilisation advanced in 
grand fashion.  The 1978 Constitution had dropped the two big limitations to universal 
suffrage – giving vote to illiterates and accepting that parties with international affiliations 
could compete – and the process itself of the Constitutional Assembly allowed for a 
rapprochment between the APRA and the military, signaling clearly and publicly that the 
former would not intervene in case the latter won.  Thus the 1978 Constitution created a new 
institutional universe, where the rotation of political elites in power was to be regulated by 
universal suffrage and competitive elections.  The previous military regime had not been 
highly repressive, and instead engaged in a broad process of social reforms; the masses had 
both supported the reforms and mobilised against the conservative turn that the dictatorship 
took in its last years, playing a fundamental role in the democratisation of the country.  
Popular organisations thrived; they had been empowered through reforms and innumerable 
succesful protests, and were strongly influenced by the Marxist left. 
 
The effects of all this were immediate.  Though in the first post-Constitution election, in 
1980, a centre-right party surprisingly won the presidency, in part because the APRA went 
divided to the elections, in the 1983 subnational elections the APRA and the left had fully 
recuperated, and from then until Fujimori they won everything.  In what sense were they 
superior alternatives?  The APRA had a historical continuity, and it was the model according 
to which the Peruvians imagined what a party really was.  According to Pablo Macera “in 
every small town in Peru there was “a police station, a Church, and an APRA locale”.29  
Indeed, Table 5 shows (according to one of Mainwaring’s key criteria) that the APRA also 
got a substantial and stable portion of the vote at the subnational (departmental and 
municipal) levels.   
 
Table 5 - An alternative, “ecological”, measure of volatility in Peru’s national elections  
 
Period President Upper house Lower house Unicame ral congress 
1980-1985 19.76% 36.65% 37.55%  
1985-1990 47.99%* 27.46% 60.53%  
1990-1995 34.45%** -- -- No comparison possible  
1995-2000 56.85%** -- -- 31.84% 
2000-2001 48.15%**   38.55% 
*Taking into account that AP participated in FREDEMO, 35.02% 
** Calculations based on the first round 
 
Internally,  the APRA acted as a “total organization”, according to Cotler,  whose obssession 
was to “encadrer” its members in a dense system of hierarchies and activities that would 
absorb all of their free time.  Historical record and oral testimony show they were able to do 
this well.  Full organisational insertion came hand- in-hand with a highly ideological 
                                                                                                                                                        
detailed study in a comparative perspective (in Ecuador, cheaters are punished, both in the streets and at the 
ballot box). 
29 Quoted in Cynthia Anne Sanborn, The democratic left and the persistence of populism in Peru: 1975-1990, 
PhD thesis, Harvard University, 1991, p.275. 
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discourse that was simultaneously anti-oligarchic, anti-US, and anticommunist.  Popular 
sectors were incorporated into the leadership.30  The levels of party discipline were extremely 
high (and remain so even today).  To the left came the panoply of Maoist, Troskyist, and 
Gramscian organisations, that had several weaknesses in relation to the APRA.  Although 
they could also claim to be following the teachings of an extraordinary national political 
thinker (José Carlos Mariátegui), they in reality did not count with their own political history 
and know-how, and were prone to ferocious factionalist bouts.  In contrast to the APRA, they 
were trapped between an increasingly succesful electoral participation and a revolutionary 
rethoric that, at least in principle, was agnostic, in the optimistic version, in relation to 
democracy;31 and indeed their performance in the Constitutional Assembly was in this regard 
rather ambiguous.  On the other hand, the legal left had a strategic advantage over all the 
other political actors: its direct connection with the mass organisations that had been highly 
empowered both by the military and the democratisation process.   In contrast, by the 1970s 
the APRA had already lost its grip on the trade unions, yielding to more radical organisations, 
and in the 1980s it campaigned in the name of unorganised workers.  So despite its 
centrifugal tendencies, the Marxist left had very strong, militant, influential, and structured 
constituencies, which no doubt helps explain why, contrary to other countries, such 
tendencies could be tamed to the point that from 1983 on it achieved electoral unity (through 
a front called United Left).  
 
We are thus faced here by a classical Duvergerian effect.  The institutionalisation of universal 
suffrage empowers the groups that are able to address more effectively the bigger social (and 
electoral) niches.  These groups develop sophisticated techniques to encadrer a mass 
constituency, but at the same time seek for active support among those groups willing and 
able to offer it: manual workers and  popular sectors, who are more prone to use their free 
time in organisational life and social activism than others.  In Peru in the 1980s we have 
circunstantial, but strong, evidence that precisely this was taking place.  In the electoral 
realm, as seen above, the lower classes felt that the APRA and the left were nearer their 
hearts, and furthermore switched their support to one or the other, depending on the 
circumstances.  For example, 60 percent of the people who voted for Alan García in 1985, 
backed the United Left candidate Alfonso Barrantes in 1986.32  In terms of organisational 
development, the results were quite impressive: popular associations were mushrooming, and 
the majority of them had some kind of link with the left.33  This prompted the APRA, and its 
dominant figure Alan García, to champion the cause of the unorganised workers,34 which 
only fed the already overdeveloped and rather sectarian structures of the APRA.   
 
In sum, apparently there were ideal conditions for two (interconnected) Duvergerian 
phenomena to take place: 
 
1. A gradual organisational build up of all political competitors, triggered by a learning 
process (people imitate winners); 
                                                 
30 Nearly 30% of all leaders were manual workers, according to an estimate in Liisa North & Jacques Doyer, 
Social composition and ideological orientations of Peru’s APRA party leadership.  Implications for the García 
presidency, Toronto: Center for Research on Latin America and the Caribbean, York University, 1993. 
31 And this in a decade where a Maoist guerrilla, Shinning Path, was seriously challenging the State.   
32 Pedro Planas, La democracia volátil.  Movimientos, partidos, líderes políticos y comportamientos electorales 
en el Peru contemporáneo, Lima: Fiedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2000. 
33 Henry Dietz, ‘Electoral politics in Peru 1978-1986’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 
(1986), pp.139-163. 
34 Sanborn (1991). 
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2. A leftist contagion, due to two facts: a) the working class left (both in the social-
democrat and communist versions) has the know-how to encadrer its members and 
supporters; and b) its supporters are more prone to use their free time in politics.  The 
existence of a leftist contagion does not mean that all parties drift towards the 
ideological left (indeed, it can involve an acute polarisation), but that all the parties 
imitate the techniques (a large scale organisational and ideological effort, and the 
identification of social niches open to it ) and discourses of the left to compete 
succesfully with it. 
But then came an earthquake – or what Peruvian commentators aptly called a tsunami. 
 
You do not debate with a chain reaction  
Although the term ‘tsunami’ is applied to Fujimori’s political revolution, in reality the 
tsunami preceded Fujimori, and helped him up, as it were, to the presidency. The tsunami 
was basically the boomerang effect of the leftist contagion, and more generally of the 
political equilibrium arrived at by the 1978 arrangements.  Why was this reaction so 
succesful (a chain reaction, indeed), and why did it take the form it took?  Possibly three 
crucial factors came into play.  First, a chronic failure of governability.  This we know for 
sure.  It is not only the existence of the incumbent curse, but the fiasco of the Alan García 
government.  García was not only a charismatic leader, who won the presidency by a 
landslide and obtained implausible levels of approval at the beginning of his government 
(more than 90 percent), he was also the first APRA president in Peruvian history.  He 
represented all that the 1978 Constitution meant: the lifting of the military veto on the APRA, 
and the inclusion of the popular sectors.  He also represented very well the contagion to the 
left: though, for historical reasons, a formal alliance between the United Left and the APRA 
never came to fruition, García pushed through a programme that included the nationalisation 
of the banks, and from the beginning of his career he was a member of the APRA wing that 
insisted on taming down anticommunism and underscoring social reform.  But after a 
promising beginning, García’s government headed for disaster.  The overall balance of his 
administration is awful: hyperinflation, economic catastrophe, and unending corruption 
scandals.35  Now APRA was the alternative to normal politics (represented by the previous 
government, that had also failed).  What was left?   
 
Then comes organisational hypertrophy.  By definition, parties offer club goods: i.e. they 
depend on their capacity to exclude others.36  Privileged access, though – particularly when it 
is organised and produced openly and massively – may generate widespread rejection, and a 
demand for unmediated participation.   
 
Third, electronic media, and especially television, possibly affected the ecology of highly 
orgainsed parties on two accounts.  On the one hand, it became one of the main uses of free 
time – perhaps the main one, undermining the allure of politics and in general of plebeian 
associational life.  This must have started earlier, but only manifested itself  clarly in the late 
1980s.  On the other, it gave individual politicians – and potential entrants – the possibility to 
address the masses over the heads, so to say, of the organisations.  So voluntary work (the 
alpha and omega of ‘old politics’) became simultaneously scarcer and less important.   It is 
difficult to find hard data supporting these conjectures, but there are instead plenty of 
                                                 
35 Paradoxically, also human rights scandals.  It must be remembered that García was facing a quite brutal 
challenge by the Shining Path guerrilla. 
36 I lean here on Weber’s venerable definition of a political party. 
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symptoms.  In 1989, Ricardo Belmont (owner of a TV and radio enterprise)37 was elected 
mayor of Lima.  He ran on an antipolitical platform, and declared that his candidacy was 
“totally independent and alien to any party ideology or catchword”.38  Thus, for the first, but 
not the last, time TV showed that it was able to defeat the parties.39    The core of 
campaigning, which before had involved meetings and marches, now “increasingly depended 
on the capacity of expression of the mass media”. 40   Making a career within a political 
organisation and casting well in TV involve two completely different sets of skills, so party 
leaders had an objective barrier to adapt to the new mode of doing things. 
 
Thus by the second half of the 1980s,  the DT party system was in the midst of a leftist 
contagion and an organisational buildup.  This empowered parties that knew very well how to 
encadrer the masses, but instead did not have any governmental experience.  The 
combination of government failure, technological change, and resistance to partitocracy, 
proved fatal for the party system.  It was victim both of its weaknesses (government failures), 
and of its strengths (organisational hypertrophy).  Thus in 1990, parties – still by far and large 
the main political entities – were totally discredited.  According to Tanaka: 
in a 1990 survey, only 5% of the interviewed believed the parties represented 
their interests.  In a 1 to 7 trust scale, the interviewed gave parties and congress a 
mark of 3.31 and 3.24 respectively, the lowest marks among all institutions.41   
In another poll, carried out later among the popular sectors of the capital, 94 percent of those 
interviewed declared their agreement with the following sentence: “people have always been 
deceived by politicians”. 42  In this second case, we find a clear association between 
antipolitical and nondemocratic attitudes.  81 percent of those interviewed manifested their 
agreement with “a just non-elected government ...that would improve the situation”. 43  The 
isolation of the party system expressed a rupture between politics and society, 44 and a fracture 
between the electoral and public opinion realms.45 
   
The simultaneous breakdown of García’s government and of the legitimacy of the party 
system opened wide the door to new entrants.  It offered two new big themes to politicians:  
 
                                                 
37 On a much more modest scale, Fujimori was anchorman of a government TV programme dedicated to 
agricultural themes. 
38 Carlos Reyna, La anunciación de Fujimori.  Alan García, 1985-1990, Lima: Desco, 2000, p.238. 
39 There is a potentially crucial fourth variable, the informalisation of labour (for the more general argument, 
DiJohn, personal communication; for the Peruvian case, Kenney 2003). I will not explore this avenue here, 
though once again there is plenty of circumstantial evidence to support it. 
40 Tanaka (1998), p.180. 
41 Tanaka (1998), p.223. 
42 Luis Pásara, ‘Cuando los políticos fracasan’, Perfiles Liberales 31 (1993), p.38. 
43 A majority also declared its preference for democracy over any other form of government.  But, as seen 
above, they held a non-standard notion of democracy: they could define it as a government of a benevolent 
leader.  Interpreters of opinion polls are seldom aware of these inconsistencies, and hail with alacrity any verbal 
majority that supports democracy. 
44 Raúl Mendoza Cánepa, ‘¿Hacia nuevos partidos políticos?’, in Comisión Andina de Juristas, Perú 2000: un 
triunfo sin democracia, Lima: Comisión Andina de Juristas, 2000, pp.345-391. 
45 Tanaka (1998). 
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1. The defense of liberal economic principles and programmes as a way of saving Peru 
from its crisis, and redeeming the masses; from the very beginning neoliberals 
incorporated a popular dimension in their programme;46  
2. The denunciation of parties, i.e. antipolitics. 
 
What deserves to be noted – and what explains Fujimori’s victory –  is that it took time to put 
these two themes together.  Antipoliticians could get good results, as Belmont was showing.  
But in the presidential campaign of 1990, liberals that were opposing García strongly 
gathered around a standard party front, FREDEMO (Front for Democracy), headed by Mario 
Vargas Llosa, the famous writer.  FREDEMO was a bizarre alloy of ‘old’ (party) and ‘new’ 
mediatic politics, as symbolised by the fact the the right wing parties had been able to 
coincide only on a typically mediatic name.  On the other hand, FREDEMO was managed 
and staged by the parties that composed it, and was extremely ideological.  Vargas held 
strong liberal convictions, and saw that his key motives – antistatism, liberty and the need for 
a decisive liberal shock – became the axes of his campaign.  Ideology was above pragmatic 
considerations, and for ideology Vargas took several steps detrimental to his electoral 
performance.47  On the other hand, FREDEMO was not much more than a gigantic mise en 
scéne, a mediatic operation that paid much more attention to TV advertisements than to mass 
organisation and mobilisation. 48  Vargas, torn apart between his ideological convictions (that 
suggested to him that strong parties were the correct thing, given that they were part of the 
organisational landscape of the democratic West), and the evidences that showed him that the 
presence of parties in his electoral undertaking would substract, not add, votes, symbolised 
the transitional character of FREDEMO. 
 
Fujimori was not hampered by ideological convictions, and following standard Downsian 
logics he searched for the centre and avoided major confrontations with his rivals.  He toned 
down the necessity of a liberal shock, and called for national unity.  Against all the odds, he 
ended up defeating his famous rival. 49  This allowed him to switch programmes, become a 
staunch neoliberal, and link the major motives of liberal policies and antipolitics that until 
then had been separated. 
 
The demolition job: the rebellion of society against politics. 
Once in government, Fujimori denounced the “dictatorship of partitocracy”. 50  Parties, he 
said in 1992:  
have become an electoral machine, that penetrate other organisations to politicise 
them unnecessarily, distorting the spirit of democracy.  Peruvian political parties 
behave as a big oligopoly of political decision and manipulation.  What is being 
                                                 
46 Neoliberalism had a programme for the popular sectors: informality and deregulation (Reyna, 2000, p.223).  
The most prominent ideologue of this tendency was Hernando de Soto, who created an influential think tank. 
47  For example, FREDEMO produced an advertisement of a monkey shitting on the country – it was supposed 
that it represented bureaucrats.  The monkey image triggered a violent debate, and heated passions against 
FREDEMO and Vargas himself (Jeff Daeschner, The war of the end of democracy.  Mario Vargas Llosa vs. 
Alberto Fujimori, Lima: Peru Reporting, 1993). 
48 There are detailed descriptions of the 1990 campaign; see, for example, the highly intelligent and amusing 
Daeschner (1993). 
49 With the support of the APRA and the left, who had been insulted ferociously by Vargas, and who believed 
that Fujimori was the lesser evil. 
50 Carlos Fernández, ‘Democracia, Fujimori y los partidos políticos’, Ideéle, 71-72, pp.95-98. 
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discussed in Peru is not the existence of democracy, but the dictatorship of 
partitocracy. 51  
Fujimori’s demolition job had a rapid success.  By the 1995 elections (which that year were 
relatively competitive),52 for all practical purposes the DT parties had disappeared.  None of 
them exceeded the threshold of 5 percent of the valid votes that the Jurado Nacional de 
Elecciones demanded to maintain their legal recognition as a party. 53  Table 6 shows 
eloquently the itinerary of such a disaster. The most affected force was by far and large the 
Marxist left, but the rightist groupings also received heavy blows.   
 
Table 6 – Evolution of the vote for system parties and the independents 1978-1995 
 
Period Votes for the main system parties (S) (%) 
Vote for independent 
candidates (I) (%) Valid Votes (%) 
1978© 88 12 84 
1980(p) 98 2 78 
1980(m) 92 8 85 
1983(m) 93 7 82 
1985(p) 97 3 86 
1986(m) 92 8 85 
1989(m) 72 28 78 
1990(p)* 68 32 85 
1992© 16 84 76 
1993(m) 34 66 75 
1995(p) 7 93 82 
1995 (m) 5 95 82 
1998(m) 12 88 87 
2000(p)* 2 98 92 
2001(p)* 26 74 86 
Source: Based on Tanaka, 1998, p. 55 and Tuesta (2001) 
© Constitutional Asambly. In 1992, elections to create a constitutional democratic congress.  
(m).  Municipal Elections. 
(p).  Presidential Elections. 
(S). System parties include AP, PPC, APRA and the left.  In 1978, the left is the sum of FOCEP, PSR, PCR, 
PCP, and UDP.  In the 1980 presidentials, it is the sum of PRT, UNIR, UI, UDP, and FOCEP.  In the 1980 and 
1986 municipals, left is Izquierda Unida- United Left.  In 1989, IU and ASI.  In 1990, the sum of IU and IS; in 
1992, MDI; in 1993, the sum of IU and MDI; in 1995, IU. 
(I) Sum of the votes of independents and small parties. 
 
The demolition of the ‘party dictatorship’ was associated, first of all, with a radical 
centralisation of power: “In Peru there are not political parties.  I am the power, that is the 
truth.  But this is a power given to me by the people.  I represent them”;54 “The depth of the 
                                                 
51 Aldo Panfichi & Cynthia Sanborn, ‘Democracia y neopopulismo en el Peru contemporáneo’, Márgenes, 13/14 
(November 1995), p.97. 
52 Tanaka (2002). 
53 Tanaka (1998), p.53. 
54 Tanaka (1998), p.55. 
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pit is such ...that it would be convenient for an Emperor to spend at least ten years solving 
problems”. 55  Checks and balances, thus, were gone.  But Fujimori also was intent on creating 
new realities, a new style of government that, as had to be, adopted and adapted experiences 
from the past.  He claimed to incorporate the popular sectors through direct democracy.   His 
1993 Constitution conferred broad opportunities for its exercise.56  According to Seldon, 
“Fujimori’s political survival strategy combines the seemingly contradictory elements of 
exclusion at the national level and inclusion at the local level”. 57  Direct democracy was 
supported through the generous use of television, which offered Fujimori the possibility of 
addressing very wide constituencies without the semblance of an organisation independent of 
the state, and of producing a powerful set of icons that allowed for the symbolic inclusion of 
the popular sectors.58 
 
But none of these slick manoeuvres would have been successful if Fujimori had not been able 
to solve the issue  of government performance.  According to Kenney, his first critical 
decision was to govern with the international financial community.59  As was seen above, 
Fujimori implemented the neoliberal shock that Vargas could only promise, and also defeated 
the Shining Path guerrilla.  In doing so, he was able to present himself as an antipolitical 
statesman, intent only on administration, 60 thus restating governance in terms of management.  
His was a government of valence issues, not of confrontational ones (the matter of 
politicians).  It is a paradox (ugly, but interesting) that the only period in which Peru escaped 
the incumbent’s curse was during the ten ruthless and undemocratic Fujimori years.  
 
Post-Fujimorism. 
The evolution of volatility 
What kind of political landscape has followed Fujimori’s fall?  Let us start by considering 
volatility.  Volatility is a critical problem for Peru, and its evolution shows nicely the 
continuities and changes of the present situation in relation to the Fujimori decade. 
 
Table 4, which displays the evolution of volatility as it is operationalised by political 
scientists (essentially the count of the number of voters that change their mind in two 
consecutive contests) shows a story of continuity at very high levels.  Fujimori’s refusal to 
attach his name to any stable tag, and the incumbent curse in the previous years, guarantee 
that during all the period considered in this paper presidential volatility was above 60 percent.  
Basically the same happened with the Congress.  Table 5 (with a non-standard, extremely 
                                                 
55 Charles Kenney, ‘Por qué el autogolpe?  Fujimori y el congreso 1990-1992’, in Tuesta Fernando (ed.), Los 
enigmas del poder.  Fujimori 1990-1996, Lima: Fiedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1997, p.94. 
56 Panfichi & Sanborn (1995). 
57 Jessica Seldon, Puzzling participation: a new authoritarianism in Peru , PhD thesis, Harvard University, 1997, 
p.1. 
58 He even created a TV character, El Chinito (The Little Chinaman), which he incarnated whenever necessary: 
“I have become popular with him, I even quote him in my speeches” (Fujimori, quoted in Jochamowitz, 1993, 
p.15). 
59 Kenney (1997). Kenney also shows that the first serious breach of democratic practices by Fujimori occurred 
when he short circuited the Congress in a process of approval of an anti-drug treaty with the United States.  
After Fujimori closed the congress, the US and other international actors put a kind of pressure on Fujimori that 
could be called optimal: sufficiently strong so as to prevent his autocratic tendencies to develop into an openly 
repressive dictatorship, and sufficiently gentle so as not to destabilise him. 
60 Fujimori was an engineer, a fact that he utilised in the building of his public image.  One of his preferred 
readings – and he boasted that it had been one of his intellectual referents during his electoral campaign – was 
the Deming management manual. 
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simple, measure of volatility) shows a somewhat different story.  Here volatility adopts an 
‘ecological’ flavour: how many votes went for tags that appeared or disappeared in two 
consecutive elections?  The table offers us a nice surprise: this kind of volatility increased 
brusquely after the first, teluric, stage of DT, and stabilised there.  Way more than one third 
of the votes go to short- lived actors.  The ‘freezing’ of the political system never took place, 
and instead disposable tags have replaced parties proper.  This is more so if one considers 
that, after the fall of Fujimori, the incumbent curse returned with full force. 
 
The APRA 
What has happened to the APRA is also a critical issue.  The APRA is the expression through 
which Peruvians acquired the knowledge of what a party is.61  Any Peruvian aspirant to be 
called a party must compete with the APRA.  Indeed, the APRA weathered Fujimori’s 
tsunami better than any other DT party; it had impressive assets to do so, and as Kenney and 
others note, it is once again fully in the game.62  However, its status has changed in several 
important ways. 
 
Table 7 A-  APRA vote at the departmental level 
 
 1963* 1966* 1980 1986 1989 1993 1998 2002 
 % % % % % % % % 
Amazonas 56.42 50.37 40.37 67.39 30.34 17.26 0.42 20.6 
Ancash 48.79 48.01 31.62 58.46 44.24 29.53 9.04 27.54 
ApurImac 48.83 46.5 19.53 55.74 11.87 10.9 —  
Arequipa 24.09 36.6 8.29 35.17 10.85 0 1.43 31 
Ayacucho 41.9 42.48 18.76 56.6 24.55 8.68 4.61 22.96 
Cajamarca 62.91 55.66 45.38 69.42 35.14 18.73 4.81 23.66 
Callao 32.79 39.75 22.38 49.39 31.89 7.76 5.09 24.11 
Cusco 31.33 37.94 16.05 57.51 15.17 4.57 4.45 15.181 
Huancavelica 47.16 45.94 11.52 54.62 13.18 5 2.08 7.13 
Huanuco 48.78 50.98 33.44 59.46 24.63 10.75 4.6 10.53 
¡ca 47.02 40.92 19.15 42.85 27.27 22.44 10.27 32.15 
Junín 35.96 50.71 13.15 51.98 11.69 3.18 1.59 20.2 
La Libertad 72.91 68.59 62.12 68.03 56.48 54.63 39.17 50.89 
Lambayeque 63.62 0 45.9 58 34.4 35.2 14.11 29.44 
Limaprov. 38.34 42.23 17 52.18 23.26 15.91 4.59 36.24 
Loreto 43.43 39.97 30.93 43.46 20.97 6.87 1.85  
Madre de Dios 53.43 53.98 28.54 46.87 29.92 25.24 3.28 19.59 
Moquegua 39.36 51.59 13.89 47.96 22.08 2.54 — 13.74 
Pasco 39.36 48.54 21.16 53.62 18.14 5.07 — 17.25 
Piura 39.45 44.69 25.63 44.18 28.7 21.97 1.92 28.25 
Puno 11.85 14.07 4.62 52.74 11.97 3.44 2.06  
San Martín 52.78 47.84 36.04 59.44 25.7 18.1 5.67 22.84 
Tacna 37.99 57.12 8.13 38.31 23.23 1.27 2.41 29.13 
Tumbes 46.8 44.79 25.38 38.99 27.11 24.71 0.93 19.28 
Ucayali   19.33 63.06 21.69 5.09 1.59 24.11 
Source: Tuesta (1997), complemented by the ONPE web page* 
 
                                                 
61 See, for example, Heraclio Bonilla & Paul Drake, El APRA: de la ideología a la praxis, Lima: Centro 
Latinoamericano de Historia Económica y Social, Editorial y Productora Gráfica Nuevo Mundo, 1989. 
62 Kenney (2003). 
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Table 7 B – APRA’s votes stability at the municipal elections  
 
 APRA 
ACCIÓN 
POPULAR 
IZQUIERDA 
UNIDA 
FRENTE 
DEMOCRATICO FNTC 
CAMBIO 
90 
VAMOS 
VECINO 
P. 
POPULAR 
CRISTIANO 
 % % % % % % % % 
1963* 44 47 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
1966* 43 46 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
1980 22 36 23 -- -- -- -- 11 
1983 33 17 29 -- -- -- -- 14 
1986 47 -- 31 -- -- -- -- 14 
1989 20 -- 18 32 -- -- -- -- 
1993 12 13 4 -- 3 -- -- 5 
1995  5 -- -- 0 19 -- 0 
1998 7 5 -- -- 1 -- 25 -- 
*In 1963 Y 1966, Apra participated in coalition with UNO (Unión Nacional Odriísta) and AP participated with 
DC 
 
 
First of all, the APRA is no longer a party that fulfills Mainwaring’s criteria of strength, as 
Tables 7A and 7B show.  Aggregating nationally the municipal votes, it is seen that APRA’s 
share has declined steadily, falling below 10% (Table 7B).  At the departmental level, APRA 
had bastions where it was invincible (‘the solid north’), and in every department, with few 
and marginal exceptions, catched a substantial portion of the vote.  Presently, it has virtually 
disappeared in some departments, and even in the solid north it has suffered a substantial 
decline (Table 7A).63  Not as strong as before, though, is not the same as irrelevant.  The 
APRA still captures one third of the preferences in national (congressional and presidential) 
elections and is highly orgainsed.  But at this level it confronts a major obstacle: governance.  
Given the record of García’s administration, any triumph in the first round is likely to trigger 
a mobilisation of everybody against the APRA in the second.  Furthermore, even if it wanted, 
the APRA can not govern as it did in the late 1980s.  What can it offer, apart from 
management?  And what strategy can it craft to come back to power, despite the rebuttal of 
parties by more than two-thirds of the Peruvians?64 
 
 
Escherian patterns? 
Now we can see easily what all Peruvian politicians, from Belmont on, continuing with 
Fujimori, and ending with Toledo, have in common: since politics is discredited, they have 
strong incentives to denounce it to win elections.  Said in the terms of Lipset and Rokkan, 
they have to politicise the (stable) fracture between politics of society.  This is Escherian 
politics indeed (politics about, and against, politics).  While the old leaders were engaged in a 
system of nested games – trying to defeat their adversaries within the party apparatus, and at 
the same time gaining the support of the voters65 – a new species of candidate appeared that 
learnt how to minimise the weight of the apparatus and profit from valence issues (growth, 
                                                 
63 Furthermore, in the golden years of Fujimorism, some of the main APRA departments switched to Fujimori.  
Some of the 1995 results are the following: : Amazonas, Fujimori (Cambio 90) took 65.26% of the vote, in 
Cajamarca 74.75%, in La Libertad 57.21%, In Lambayeque 62.27%, in Madre de Dios 62.23%, in San Martín 
63.36%, and in Ucayali 76.57% (Fujimori nationally captured 64% of the valid votes). 
64 In 2004, the APRA for the first time in its history decided to create an electoral front to summon a broad 
alliance that would take it to power. 
65 Tanaka (1998). 
  
17
stability, and crucially the rejection of corrupt and incompetent politicians);66 and the 
Fujimori experience taught them that television was the best technological device for 
addressing the voters.67  Why could this happen?  Basically, because the process of party 
system creation that was taking place in Peru crashed against extremely hostile conditions (in 
part created by the parties themselves).  The impossibility of establishing a social democratic 
pact – as García’s government showed – and of sustaining a model of party building based on 
mass-street mobilisation and organisational insertion, halted brusquely the Duvergerian 
contagion drive and triggered a new one, characterised by organisational entropy.  Big 
organisations get in the way of succesful candidates, because they are increasingly redundant, 
because they are an inevitable source of internal disputes, but especially because they give 
the wrong signal: isolation and distinctness vis-à-vis ‘civil society’ and the ‘common man’.   
To be succesful, candidates have to show their transparency and independence. Besides, free 
time is used consuming television.  No politician, not even those who enthus iastically 
demand the need for strong parties, can ignore the terms and trends of this cycle of 
contagion. 68 
 
All this helps to specify the legacy of the Fujimori period and the reasons for its persistence.  
What Fujimori did was to politicise the fracture between politics and society, a Escherian 
cleavage, linking it to a specific form of governance (what I call elsewhere 
semidemocracy).69  The Escherian cleavage is still the main one, but political actors have 
strong incentives as well – given international constraints and the catastrophic end of 
Fujimori’s regime – to delink it from semi-democracy.  Said in other terms, there is a more or 
less conscious effort to separate antipolitical discourse and practices from semidemocratic 
governance (to which it was initially strongly connected).70  The Escherian cleavage is 
riddled by internal inconsistencies: politics against politics, mainly.71  Furthermore, some of 
the most cherished themes of Fujimori were part of the discourse and programmes of the 
international mode of governance (direct democracy, transparency), and were taken directly 
from that repertoire, so they are a strong focal point.  What Peruvian politicians are doing is 
wording such themes in a way that is compatible with fully competitive politics (but not 
necessarily with strong party structures).  Thus the Escherian cleavage is not a proper base for 
the foundation of a stable political system.  Tags come and go, but stable patterns (chronic 
organisational instability) far from equilibrium remain.  This puts a heavy burden on 
democracy, which needs – at least until the contrary is demonstrated – working parties.  If in 
the midst of the Duvergerian cycle the threat party dyamics posed on democracy was excess 
of organisation – which implied a totalizing trend – in the antipolitical cycle the dynamics 
                                                 
66 See Kurt Weyland, ‘La paradoja del éxito? Los determinantes del apoyo político al presidente Fujimori’, 
Sociología 25 (2000), pp.213-244. A very good symptom of this is that presently there is a broad discussion in 
Peru, the main motive of which is the opening of the political system (Tanaka, 2004).  Despite the complete 
destruction of partitocracy, its shadow still looms large. 
67 But the only one, though even anti-TV techniques relied on direct contact, not on highly developed 
organisational structures. 
68 The first symptoms of the cycle may have had early manifestations.  As candidate, Alan Garcia wanted to 
change the party structures and promote a raprochement to civil society (Sanborn, 1991, p.109). As president, he 
tried to move his party away from governmental decisions.   
69 Francisco Gutiérrez, ‘Fragile democracy and schizophrenic liberalism: exit, voice, and loyalty in the Andes’, 
International Political Science Review, 26:1 (2005), pp.125-139. 
70 Maxwell Cameron, ‘Self coups: Peru, Guatemala, and Russia’, Journal of Democracy, 9:1 (1998), pp.125-
138. 
71 But not only.  It would not be exaggerated to say that regarding politics Latin America’s modernisation effort 
is full of (at least partially) inconsistent demands.  Candidates, for example, can blame ‘politicians’ for their 
failure to build strong parties, and then a personalist and antipolitical campaign in the name of the need of 
strengthening and modernising the political system. 
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pose the inverse danger: organisational entropy.  After all, democracy is about politics.  As 
Carey notes, in Peru a conflict between transparency and (the possibility) of collective action 
is taking place.72 
 
In this sense, the Peruvian experience is not so extraordinary.  In several Latin American 
countries the fracture between politics and society took place, more or less in the same 
period, and it offered political entrepreneurs incentives to politicise it.  In Peru this fracture 
was particularly deep because of the strength of the previous Duvergerian cycle and the lack 
of governmental experience of the democratic parties. All the other consequences follow. 
 
 
                                                 
72 John Carey, ‘Transparency versus collective action: Fujimori’s legacy and the Peruvian congress’, 
Comparative Political Studies 36:9 (2003), pp.983-1006. 
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